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Introduction
Ever since the end of what the French call les trentes glorieuses, wave after wave of commentators has assured us that the future of social solidarity, in particular as expressed 
in the welfare state that was largely constructed during that period, is bleak. First the ‘#scal crisis’ 
resulting from the era of ‘stag!ation’ was forecast to lead to an inevitable dismantling of the 
welfare state (see, e.g., O’Connor 1973), then globalization was to force competing nations into 
a ‘race to the bottom’ (Mishra 1999), then the introduction of the Euro was seen as a more or less 
deliberate strategy to undermine Europe’s welfare states (Hay 2000; Martin and Ross 1999), and 
now we are told that the Greek debt crisis is just the beginning of an inevitable wave of cutbacks 
to get our collective #scal houses in order again. It is “payback time” at last, according to a recent 
article in the New York Times, as “The de#cit crisis that threatens the euro has also undermined the 
sustainability of the European standard of social welfare, built by left-leaning governments since 
the end of World War II” (Erlanger 2010).
Yet these successive waves of dire predictions have been consistently found to be greatly 
exaggerated. While there certainly has been a considerable amount of deregulation and 
privatization during the period of supposed neoliberal hegemony that followed les trentes 
glorieuses, there has been significant re-regulation as well (Sarfati and Bonoli 2002) and overall 
government social expenditures as a proportion of GDP has barely budged in most OECD 
countries (Adema and Ladaique 2009; Castles 2005; Navarro, Schmitt and Astudillo 2004).There 
is room for debate about whether or not this means that there has been a significant retreat 
from an erstwhile social contract (see Clasen and Siegel 2007; Korpi 2003). As well, there is no 
question that many of the programs implemented during the postwar period have undergone 
significant reforms in many countries over the past couple of decades, mostly in an ‘activating’ 
direction (see, e.g., Palier 2010). But overall, the welfare state appears to be considerably more 
robust than the pessimists have feared and than its detractors had hoped. What accounts for 
this remarkable robustness?
In these short re!ections I want to consider two main sets of reasons for this surprising 
durability. Together, I think, they provide grounds for a rather more optimistic perspective on the 
future fate of the welfare state, although, of course, at this point no one can predict with any degree 
of con#dence what the outcome of the present debt crisis is going to be. I will mainly consider the 
classical social protection policies, such as unemployment bene#ts, pensions, sickness bene#ts and 
social assistance. I will leave other major programs that are sometimes viewed as part of the state’s 
social expenditures, in particular publicly provided or insured healthcare and education, largely 
aside. My main reason for this is that these latter programs are much less controversial than the 
former ones, at least with respect to the issues I wish to discuss in this paper.
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Social Protection and Public Opinion:  
A Surprisingly Enduring Consensus
Since WWII we have allegedly witnessed two massive 
swings of the political pendulum: the rise of the welfare 
state/’Keynesian’/Fordist state-market accommodation from 
the 1950s until the late 1970s, followed by the neoliberal 
reaction against its supposed excesses. Much of that neoliberal 
reaction - such as it was - consisted of the claim that the welfare 
state as it had been constructed in most Western countries in 
the postwar period had become economically unsustainable 
and needed, therefore, to be drastically cut back. Yet for all the 
rhetorical bluster by the various representatives of this 
supposedly newly ‘hegemonic’ neoliberal creed (see, e.g., Peck 
2001), the remarkable thing is that it appears to have had little 
or no e"ect on public opinion. In spite of 30-odd years of 
supposed neoliberal retrenchment, an almost ‘social-democratic’ 
consensus about the desirability of the range of social protection 
programs as a way to guarantee a minimum standard of living 
for all appears to have endured across the advanced 
democracies. The remarkable resilience of this cross-national 
consensus has been documented time and again in the growing 
body of literature on public opinion with respect to various 
forms of publicly provided social protection since the 1970s. 
While there are some important and systematic di"erences 
between countries as well as programs, virtually everywhere 
where such survey research has been conducted most standard 
social protection policies meet with majority or 
even overwhelming majority support among 
the general public. 
Slightly oversimpli#ed, the general 
patterns are as follows. Across the board, 
overwhelming majorities favor governmental 
responsibility for health care for the sick and a 
decent standard of living for the old. In most 
countries the proportions of the population 
supporting these notions run between 80 to 
over 90%. But even in the United States, for all 
its welfare state exceptionalism, around three 
quarters of the population support statements 
along these lines. State provision of ‘a decent standard of living 
for the unemployed’ and income redistribution and social 
assistance (‘welfare’ in the US) receive more variable support 
across countries, with solid majorities in favor of both on the 
European continent but roughly between 30 and 50% support in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries (Bean and Papadakis 1998; Svallfors 
2003; Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004). 
Even more striking, however, is the stability over time of these 
generally favorable attitudes towards welfare state programs 
across the industrialized world, or at least the ‘older’ industrialized 
countries of Europe, North America and the Antipodes. While the 
occasional dip and peak is recorded in the literature, generally in 
connection with changes in government and public discourse, 
overall and over the entire period from the earliest surveys in the 
1980s until the latest available #gures, majority public support 
for the range of policies associated with the welfare state has 
remained stable and solid (Bean and Papadakis 1998; Brooks 
and Manza 2007; Edlund and Svallfors 2009; Svallfors 2003). 
This robustness of public support for welfare programs is all 
the more remarkable since it largely holds even for the US, the 
supposed anti-welfare outlier, and it appears to have withstood 
the aforementioned swing of the pendulum towards a new 
neoliberal ‘hegemony’ quite unscathed.
To be sure, there has been plenty of debate at the margins 
about the means (private vs. public provision) and the levels and 
conditions of various forms of social protection in each of the 
countries concerned. Moreover, there is room for debate about 
whether public opinion follows or determines policy in these 
matters (Brooks and Manza 2006; Brooks and Manza 2007). Yet 
the sheer solidity of public opinion in this regard suggests to 
me that it would be quite di$cult indeed for any government 
to advocate anything other than marginal tinkering with the 
classic welfare state programs, even in the face of dire #nancial 
circumstances. Or could the current debt crisis be so severe that, 
public support or no, we simply can’t a!ord the luxury of the 
current welfare state?
Social Protection and the Economy: It’s Not All Deadweight
Note that all pessimistic forecasts about the future fate of 
the welfare state have one thing in common: they all assume 
that social welfare programs are inherently a net burden on the 
economy, i.e., that public expenditures on such programs are, 
economically speaking, a deadweight loss. 
Oddly enough, it is an assumption that 
both advocates and foes of the welfare 
state tend to take for granted. And there is 
a well-rehearsed set of arguments to back 
it up as well: such expenditures ‘crowd out’ 
more economically productive investments 
and expenditures, they produce perverse 
incentives to shirk in various ways, they 
cause labor market rigidity, they discourage 
innovation, etc. Yet for all the apparent self-
evidence of the assumption and supporting 
arguments, the relationship between social 
expenditures and economic growth is far from clear. There 
is by now a vast literature trying to link social expenditures 
and individual social protection policies to economic growth, 
productivity and employment and the results show no clear 
relationship, whether positive or negative. This is a very technical 
business with much debate about the speci#cation of variables, 
theoretical and methodological assumptions and so forth, 
but the general upshot is simply that, so far, no clear negative 
relationship has been demonstrated (see, e.g., Agell, Lindh and 
Ohlsson 1997; Mares 2007). As Mares sums it up: 
The strong predictions of a negative relationship between 
higher levels of social protection and growth and employment have 
not been borne out in the data. While some studies "nd support for 
these propositions, empirical results are very fragile and not robust 
in regard to changes in sample size or statistical speci"cation” 
(Mares 2007: 67)
Today, ‘activation’ is all 
the rage across the range of 
di#erent welfare state regimes 
   SPRING 2010 | PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPE   8
THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY
In view of such #ndings a number of authors have come to 
the conclusion that the welfare state is essentially neutral with 
respect to economic performance, that is, it does not necessarily 
hurt economic growth (e.g., Bassanini and Venn 2008; Honeck 
2006; Kenworthy 2004; Korpi 1985; Lindert 2004; Mares 2007; 
Scruggs and Allan 2006). But what if the welfare state, or at least 
some variants or aspects of it, are actually supportive of economic 
e$ciency, productivity and growth? There are a number of 
suggestions, scattered over more or less unconnected literatures, 
as to how, why and when this might in fact be the case. Here I can 
only brie!y refer to a few which seem to me to be worthy of much 
more systematic attention than they have received so far.
Roughly speaking, one can distinguish between four types 
of arguments in favor of economically bene#cial e"ects of social 
protection policies: economic, political, social-psychological and 
macro-sociological arguments. The economic arguments range 
from those about the bene#ts of ‘Keynesian stabilizers,’ which 
have been revived forcefully in the wake of the present #nancial 
crisis (see, for instance, the lively debates about Clarke 2009 ; 
Skidelsky 2009), to the argument that generous income support 
for the unemployed may actually improve the eventual ‘matching’ 
of job seekers and jobs (Bassanini and Venn 2008; Marimon and 
Zilibotti 1999). While both of these arguments have some prima 
facie plausibility—though the Keynesian argument deals with 
stabilization rather than growth—the highly technical literature 
on the latter and the highly politically charged debate on the 
former remain, for now, rather inconclusive.
By ‘political’ arguments I mean a variety of ‘neocorporatist’ claims 
to the e"ect that under certain institutional conditions—including, 
at a minimum, strong unions and employers’ organizations and 
centralized bargaining—a well-developed welfare state can 
serve to underwrite relatively cooperative industrial relations, 
which, in turn, can produce the prudent, well-balanced wage and 
employment bargains that support competitiveness and growth in 
the economy as a whole. It is an idea that has been around for some 
time (Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Schmitter 1974; Schmitter 
and Lehmbruch 1979) and that has spawned a vast and contentious 
literature. While the general argument continues to attract attention 
(Mares 2007: 76), attempts to test it empirically have been fraught 
with speci#cation, overdetermination, and comparability problems 
(Smith 1992: Ch. 6). 
Then there is a variety of ‘social-psychological’ arguments 
based on the notion that workers who feel less insecure will 
act in ways that promote rather than undermine productivity 
and growth. Probably the best-known version of this argument 
originates from the literature on internal labor markets, but it has 
also been presented in favor of job protection legislation. The 
argument is that. if workers feel safe and secure in their current 
jobs or with their current employers, then they will be more 
willing to invest in their own human capital, in particular so-called 
‘speci#c’ human capital (i.e., not transferable between employers 
and/or occupations), as well as more willing to share their skills 
and knowledge with fellow workers than would otherwise be the 
case (Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn 2009; Osterman 1988). 
But while internal labor markets appear to be on the wane, 
and job protection legislation of the kind practiced in the 
Mediterranean countries is de#nitely out of favor, there is a slightly 
di"erent variant of this argument with a particular Scandinavian 
!avor. Here the argument is that security of earnings and 
employability provided by generous unemployment insurance 
bene#ts and training and job-searching support will render 
workers more willing to invest in their own speci#c and general 
human capital, to share their knowledge with fellow workers, 
and to accept technological change and to take on jobs that are 
relatively risky in terms of their long-term employment prospects. 
This argument has been made in particular on behalf of the 
Danish and Swedish versions of what is now called ‘!exicurity’: the 
combination of generous unemployment insurance bene#ts and 
a strong emphasis on activation through skill upgrading increases 
the willingness of workers to take risks and move between jobs 
and employers (Acemoglu and Shimer 2000; Bassanini and Venn 
2008; Mares 2007; van den Berg 2009). It has been applied to 
independent entrepreneurs as well: social security, including the 
assurance of an adequate pension, encourages greater risk-taking 
on the part of (presumably relatively small) entrepreneurs as well 
(Sinn 1996). Plausible as these ideas may appear at #rst sight, 
they have proven to be extraordinarily di$cult to test empirically 
(as my colleagues and I found out the hard way: van den Berg, 
Furåker and Johansson 1997; van den Berg et al. 2000).
But the original framers of the so-called ‘Swedish Model’ 
were under no illusion that the security provided by generous 
‘passive’ bene#ts would automatically turn Swedish workers 
into enthusiastic risk-takers and job-hoppers. In addition, 
they recommended a stringent regime of ‘active labor market 
policies,’ the aim of which was not only to counteract any 
possible negative incentive e"ects of those bene#ts, but also to 
enhance the smooth functioning of the labor market in the face 
of accelerated structural change and help reconcile the unions to 
that accelerated change (van den Berg, Furåker and Johansson 
1997: 86-90). Today, ‘activation’ is all the rage across the range 
of di"erent welfare state regimes (Bonoli 2010; van den Berg 
2008), although there are enormous di"erences in its mode of 
implementation (Pascual and Magnusson 2007). Current policy 
makers are no doubt in part motivated by a desire to get the (long-
term) unemployed o" the bene#t rolls. The evidence that these 
policies actually succeed in doing this, particularly in times of high 
unemployment, is decidedly mixed (for a quite critical review of 
the evaluation literature on Sweden’s long-standing policies, 
see Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström 2002; see also Martin and 
Grubb 2001). Even so, the many current experiments with a wide 
range of programs encouraging, coaxing or even forcing bene#t 
recipients to #nd employment, acquire skills that enhance their 
employability, etc. (OECD 2003: p. 174) may well have long-term 
bene#cial e"ects for the economy as a whole, even if they do not 
necessarily succeed in putting the unemployed back to work in 
the short term. This was, in e"ect, what Gösta Rehn, one of the 
architects of the original Swedish approach, thought would be 
one of the main payo"s of active labor policies: even if during 
periods of relative job scarcity some of the unemployed are 
e"ectively simply ‘parked’ in some ‘active’ program or other, this 
may still have the considerable economic bene#t of preventing 
human capital atrophy and enlarging the pool of labor well-
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prepared to go back to work at the end of the downturn. This, too, 
strikes me as at least prima facie a plausible claim, but not one that 
has, to my knowledge, been seriously tested empirically. Finally, 
under the rubric of macro-sociological bene#cial e"ects, I would 
consider a whole range of desiderata, from lower crime rates to 
better popular health, that may well result from generous social 
protection programs. There is now a burgeoning literature on 
such more di"use social bene#ts (see, e.g., Wilkinson and Pickett 
2010). There is no doubt that the potential economic bene#ts 
from such e"ects are quite considerable, but we are still very far 
from being able to make any reasonable estimates as to the net 
size of such bene#ts.
In short, there are a number of ways in which at least some 
welfare state programs may well generate quite sizeable bene#ts 
for the economy. But we still know painfully little about whether 
and when this is in fact the case and how large the net bene#ts are 
likely to be. There is a vast potential research agenda here for social 
scientists who are willing and able to conduct research that may or 
may not end up con#rming their political biases and preferences. 
Meanwhile, policy makers would be well-advised to tread carefully 
when contemplating drastic changes in welfare state programs in 
their attempts to deal with the current budget crisis, lest they throw 
out the economic baby with the social bath water.
Conclusion
It is, of course, seriously misleading to talk about the welfare 
state as though it was a single set of institutions to be found in 
all countries concerned. In fact, as a growing literature has made 
clear, even talking about any limited number—whether three, 
four, or #ve—of distinct ‘welfare regimes’ constitutes a gross 
oversimpli#cation. Each country has its own complicated web 
of inter-articulated institutions and programs which may look 
quite similar but produce radically di"erent e"ects, or look quite 
di"erent and produce surprisingly similar ones. When it comes 
to the economic e"ects of the welfare state, or the implications 
of the current debt crisis for the welfare state, such simpli#cation 
borders on the disingenuous. Any such complex set of policies, 
programs and institutions is bound to have all kinds of possibly 
contradictory economic e"ects and, as a result, the debt crisis 
has no general implications for the welfare state. 
In fact, the euro crisis does not appear to have undermined 
the welfare state as such, but rather certain quite speci#c welfare 
states, namely the more or less clientelistic ones around the 
Mediterranean rim. The Nordic countries, with their far more 
elaborate and expensive welfare states, seem to have weathered 
the current crisis much better--with the exception of Iceland, 
that is. These Nordic countries are also the ones that have most 
consciously and explicitly designed their welfare programs to be 
compatible with, and supportive of, a successful, heavily export-
dependent private sector. In the process they may learned to 
put some of the bene#cent potential of certain (combinations 
of ) welfare state programs to their advantage. It is high time that 
we researchers start catching up.
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